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 76 women and tShe rul:e of law
 in Hungary
 Krisztina Morvai
 I would like to identify four factors that in my opinion largely determine the
 status of 'women and the law' in Hungary (and probably in other £ast and
 Central £uropean countries) after the democratic transition. These are
 resistance to womens rights as alien to 'Hungarian culture', obsession with the
 rule of law, a formal and gender-blind construction of sex equality, and the
 vehement protection of the 'private sphere' from government interference.
 As a way of exploring these factors I would like to share, in a brief and
 accessible way, my own observations and experiences as a Hungarian feminist
 lawyer.
 Finally, I shall introduce some court judgements in order to illustrate the
 hidden/sub-conscious gender bias and at times openly discriminative attitude
 of the judiciary that, I feel, should be a focus of feminist critical analysis (at
 present almost non-existent) in the field of law.
 our culture the last bastion of Hungarian
 identity and integrity
 In the office, one of my male colleagues yet again asked me about my sexual
 life and another, yet again, told me to lose weight.
 At a meeting on law reform ideas, a couple of academics suggested that all
 women should have an enforceable right to be sexually harassed at work at
 least once a year.
 At a conference dinner, some of the participating judges suggested that all
 wives should have an enforceable right to be raped by their husbands at least
 once a month.
 All these people thought they were being very funny. After long years of silence
 and embarrassment in similar situations, I finally decided to say something.
 I told them on all three occasions that there are several countries in the world
 where people in their position could find themselves in big trouble for making
 such statements. Moreover, I told them these are the countries that we
 (Hungary) want to join as part of the £.U. These are the countries we envy.
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 These are the countries we identify as £urope or as Western civilization. On all
 three occasions, they responded with the same argument: 'Our culture is different.
 We dont want those alien standards to be imposed on us. Our nation is lively, funny
 and sexy. We enjoy this sort of thing. What Western women take as harassment
 Hungarian women take as courtship'.
 Indeed, it appears that what 'they' call sexual harassment, 'we' call fun. What they
 call marital rape, we call marriage. This is 'our culture'. It seems that 'culture' is
 something the law cannot and should not attempt to comprehend. Culture is
 'exempt' from the law and therefore outside the scope of the rule of law. Those
 whose lives are defined as part of the culture have hardly any influence on defining
 'culture'. Because of the central role of 'culture' in national integrity and identity,
 challenging the justification of 'culture' equals disloyalty. While it is argued that
 culture integrates a nation, it is easy to ignore the way culture can also operate as
 a means of exclusion.
 Since control over the 'nation's women' seems to be central to the definition of
 culture universally, 'our culture' is always at stake in any attempt to
 reconceptualize gender to include women within the scope of the rule of law.
 This is particularly true at times of discontinuity in the perceived integrity of a
 nation. From this perspective, the current stage of Hungarian history is rather
 complex.
 £ver since the beginning of state socialism in Hungary (after the Second World
 War), there has been a certain nostalgia in the air about the good old times when
 our nation was able to live according to 'our own culture'. It is unclear what
 exactly that culture was, who defined it and whose culture we are really talking
 about. It appears that references to it are made rather arbitrarily depending on
 who is talking on behalf of the 'nation'.
 What is clear is that state socialism is seen as a fundamental interference with,
 and interruption to, that culture. With regard to gender, this means that all the
 steps (formal or actual) taken towards the equality of women duringthe socialist
 period are often viewed as alien to our culture and tradition and as having been
 forced upon us. I should add here that gender equality, along with class equality,
 was an important part of the ideology of state socialism. £astern and Central
 £uropean societies have therefore been in a quite unique situation in which the
 equality of women was among the aims of official government politics. However,
 this official aim was neither preceded, nor backed up, by mass grassroots
 movements or advanced consciousness.
 Following the democratic transition in 1989, we began to concentrate our efforts
 on joining the £uropean Union and more generally on becoming integrated into
 £urope. While this seems to be an unavoidable necessity, certain elements of the
 integration are perceived as major threats to our regained national independence
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 and 'our culture'. Issues of gender equality, and in particular of womens rights, are
 yet again seen as being externally imposed.
 obsession with the 'rule of law'
 While current Western schools and movements of legal thought tend to recognise
 that 'the law' cannot be approached in a vacuum or observed without critically
 analysing its close connection with power relations, class, race, gender and other
 social factors, the tendency in £astern £urope appears to be the opposite. In other
 words, the critical or deconstructing attitude towards the law is almost non-
 existent in this region, or at least in Hungary.
 A recognition of the social construction of the law is seen as part of the legacy of
 Marxist thought and therefore as an obstacle to 'progress'. The legal community,
 as well as society at large, see the law as completely independent and separated
 from politics.
 As a reaction to the openly political character of state socialist law when the law
 was admittedly one of the means of achieving a social aim, namely communist
 society, transitional societies were quick to identify themselves as 'states based
 on the rule of law' (Rechtstaat). If the rule of law is defined as the visibility,
 predictability and foreseeability of the relationship between the state and the
 individual, the rule of law as a principle would certainly be a major improvement
 on arbitrariness.
 However, a general understanding of the rule of law implies certain other elements
 that are far less promising, particularly for women. First of all, we tend to identify
 'the law' as the black letters of the law, and pretend that written rules and
 regulations are simply applied without interpretation. Principles, policies and
 practices of interpretation are not considered to be part of the law. At least two
 facts follow from the above element of the rule of law principle. The first is a
 practical one. If visible written laws seem to be fair to women, in other words if
 written laws and regulations do not imply prime facie discrimination, then 'the law'
 itself is seen as non-discriminative and therefore fair to women. It also follows
 that by writing just words in the form of laws (that are) made by legitimate law-
 making bodies and by making these written laws accessible to the people, we also
 ensure that these laws have one, and only one, meaning that is applied by
 independent judges and other agents of law enforcement. Making 'good laws' and
 applying them in the one and only way is seen as a basically technical issue. The
 laws are considered to be good if they are non-political, value-free and neutral.
 We desperately believe that they are.
 In this approach, if the black letters of the law are value-free (i.e. if they do not
 favor any race, class or gender over the other), then the law and the whole legal
 system are value free, objective and neutral. At this stage, it appears that the
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 'rule of law' itself is perceived to be an adequate safeguard for the treatment of
 women as equal citizens.
 the formal and gender-blind construction of
 'equality'
 Third periodic re- In its third periodic report (1996) to the United Nations' C£DAW Committee,1 the
 (CEDAW/C/HUN/3, Hungarian Government issued a statement that through its legislation:
 see CEDAW/C/SR.
 304 and 305) ' These enactments afford legal guarantees for womens equality through strengthening
 the general equality of citizens rather than by special laws and regulations relative to
 women . . . '
 Indeed, if we look at our 'black letter laws' in the books, we can be satisfied to see
 that there are hardly any openly and clearly discriminatory laws, in other words
 any rules or regulations that set different and unequal standards for female and
 male citizens.
 By looking merely at the written laws, we could therefore conclude that the legal
 system treats women and men as equal citizens. The most successful approach of
 governments in proving that they stand for gender equality is simply to make a
 checklist of 'the laws' (in the narrow sense of written laws) and not to look at how
 these laws are interpreted, applied and enforced. Neither the 'neutrality'
 requirement of the rule of law principle, nor the 'equality' doctrine take into
 account the fact that women and men not only have different sex organs but also
 different lives, stories, and experiences.
 '£quality' would make sense, should it mean that both the female and the male
 experiences would equally be included in the standards that are defined as
 'neutral'. If we look closely at how the prime facie neutral and equal laws are
 defined, we find that the standards of neutrality and equality are largely based on
 male experiences. When the law treats women as men's equals, it typically means
 that it treats them as if they were men. When the apparently neutral laws are
 applied, it turns out that the neutral, objective and equal standards basically
 exclude and deny women's realities. (Those interpretations of several criminal laws
 quoted in the section of this paper dealing with gender and the law in action are
 obvious examples.) It seems that it is the (equal) inclusion of female realities that
 would jeopardize the neutral character of legal standards.
 According to the law, male is 'neutral' and woman is non-neutral. Consequently,
 male is understood as 'objective' whereas woman is by definition subjective. It
 follows therefore that the inclusion of a consideration of the female destroys
 objectivity and neutrality. While we should celebrate that women are treated
 'equally', we must ask the question '£qual to whom?' The answer is obviously '£qual
 to men'. £qualized with something pre-existing: The male norm. But what if
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 women's experiences and realities simply cannot be interpreted in the light of the
 standard that is set to define 'the equal'? For example, if women are battered at
 home and men are not, how can the law treat them 'equally'?
 In current £astern £uropean thinking, we look back critically to a time when law,
 economy, education and all other fields of life were 'ideologically' determined.
 Now we do not want any ideology to be imposed on us.
 Feminism orX more generally, gender-concerned analysis of, and attitudes to, law,
 economy, education and other fields is seen as 'ideological' and therefore a
 reminder of the communist experience. Observation and analysis from women's
 perspectives are seen as non-neutral. Feminism is seen as 'ideological' in spite of
 the fact that it challenges and demystifies male ideology Attempts to include the
 'female' in the 'objective' are attempts to point out the bias in the 'neutral', in
 other words, to make up for centuries of actual non-neutrality and to challenge
 the monopoly of the male perspective. However, at this particular point in time in
 our region these attempts are rejected and ridiculed not only in conservative
 circles (as they continue to be in Western societies), but also by those who identify
 themselves as liberals, left wing or progressive.
 The denial of the need for a critical deconstruction of the law, the genuine belief
 in the neutrality and objectivity of the law and in the full separation of law and
 politics are, in my view, very specific to post-communist legal thinking. These
 factors are severe obstacles to satisfactorily reconstructing our legal systems for
 the benefit of women.
 the vehement protection of the private sphere
 and private life
 Communism as an ideology was committed to seeing and identifying individuals
 primarily as part of a community. People were expected to achieve happiness not
 as individuals but as elements of society.
 A major component of this attitude was effectively the attempt to break down the
 private/public boundary, dissolving the two spheres into each other. While in the
 Western world challenging the private/public boundary is very much part of a
 'progressiveX agenda (which includes the law) the reverse is the tendency in Central
 £urope .
 In fact, there are several historical reasons for being cautious about the protection
 of private life from government intrusion in this region. One of the 'trademarks' of
 state socialism was almost total control over the individual by the government.
 One means of achieving this control was the lack of safeguards against access to
 the private sphere. As opposed to the Western constitutional tradition, where the
 104 fe m i n i st rev i ew 76 2 0 0 4 Women and the rule of law in Hungary
This content downloaded from 
             194.38.118.24 on Mon, 26 Apr 2021 13:22:38 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 protection of private homes from government access in the form of arbitrary
 searches and seizures is traditionally carefully safeguarded by the law, the
 situation in state socialism was rather different. This legacy is a genuine obstacle
 to putting the 'private sphere', in particular life in private homes, into the
 mainstream of the concern of the law.
 gender and the law in action
 In the last part of this piece, I want to illustrate the above points by citing some
 court decisions published in the periodical summarizing leading court cases in
 different fields (Court decisions/Birosagi Hatarozatok). These Supreme Court and
 regional (appeal) court judgements provide guidance to all the courts in Hungary
 regarding the correct application of the law.
 The first group of cases concern the evaluation of sentencing factors in the light of
 the 'contribution of the victim' to the crimes committed. Moreover, it is interesting
 and informative to observe the language used by the courts in the construction of
 gender roles, the exclusion of the female 'other' and the parallel inclusion (total
 identification with) the male victim who is portrayed as 'one of us'. While it is
 denied that the law is a means of social engineering, it is obvious from these cases
 that this is indeed what the courts do when they 'apply' the law.
 The first two of the total of three cases I am dealing with here appeared in the
 same volume of Court Decisions. Both of them are about violent crimes rape
 and robbery, respectively.
 In the first case, a 17-year-old woman was invited into the barracks by a friend of
 her's, a conscript soldier who wanted to talk with her. The young woman climbed
 through the fence and started chatting to the man. After a while, he wanted to
 kiss her, but she refused. At this stage, the perpetrator took a loaded submachine
 gun, pointed it at her and told her to take her clothes off. She started to cry,
 desperately wanted to escape and asked for the help of other soldiers on the
 premises, with no success. The perpetrator finally raped her at gunpoint.2
 In the second case, the victim was a young man who was fishing at a lake in the
 middle of a deserted park at a late hour. He was approached by one of the
 perpetrators (the other two were watching), who pointed a knife at him and told
 him to hand over his fishing gear. Under the influence of the threat, he did so.3
 How did the courts analyze these two cases? In the first one, the Supreme Court
 declared on appeal that in the
 'first instance the court mistakenly concluded that there was no contribution at all by the
 victim. The 17-year-old victim, in the late evening hours, voluntarily - at that stage
 without any force or threat - agreed to enter the territory of the barracks. According to the
 available evidence, the neighborhood of the barracks was unknown to the victim who lived
 2Court Decisions BH
 1993. 281
 3Court Decisions BH
 1993. 284
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 far away from it and had never visited that area eariier. Although the climbing into the
 barracks was initiated by the perpetrator, the fact that the young girl, whose physicai
 development was adequate to her age, entered the military premises that were used
 exclusively by men, was thoughtless and reckless in behaviour. Through this, she contributed
 to a situation in which the perpetrator could realize his will against her's without any
 obstacle and committed the crime against her sexual freedom. According to Guiding
 Principie number 12 of the Supreme Court, the behaviour of the victim is a significant
 sentencing factor in cases of crimes against sexual morals. According to this version of
 events, it appears that the behavior of the victim was reckless, if not directly provocative,
 and that therefore the court concludes that the victim has contributed to her own demise.
 The Supreme Court declares that the victim, by her thoughtless behavior contributed to the
 realization of the crime and this is a mitigating circumstance. Taking into account this
 circumstance, the sentence by the first instance court is exaggerated and should be
 decreased. Therefore, the prison sentence imposed by the first instance court
 (4 years and 6 months) is decreased to 3 years imprisonment.' (verbatim quotation of
 the court decision)
 In the second case, the Court analysed the events in the park in the following way:
 'In judging this case, one must take into account the atmosphere in society that is a result
 of an increase of crimes against the person and the property. This atmosphere was abused
 by the perpetrators when they carefully chose the place and the time for the crime, namely
 that they went to the park that is visited by just a few peopie and is considered to be
 deserted in the late hours. They picked a victim who is much younger and physically weaker
 than they are and who was practically delivered to the perpetrators. The victim had no
 freedom of choice in that situation given that he had no doubt that shouid he not hand
 over his fishing gear, his physical integrity would be in danger. In the view of the Court, no
 victim should be expected to expose himself to forthcoming assault in order to save his
 property. This means that the perpetrators only had to create a situation in which the
 victim felt threatened and recognized that he either acts as the perpetrator demands and
 hands over the fishing gear or the perpetrators would take it from him by force.l
 In the third case, a male citizen applied for, and received, an entrepreneur's
 license. Although he opened a bank account, he had no money in it. Two large
 companies sold him substantial amounts of goods without ever checking his
 financial status. He never paid for the goods and was prosecuted and convicted of
 fraud. In evaluating the sentencing circumstancesX the statement read:
 'The Supreme Court shared the view of the chief prosecutor that it must be excluded from
 the mitigating circumstances that the victims' behavior made it easier for the perpetrator
 to commit the crimes. This is so because in the field of business no one can be blamed for
 having confidence in his partner. According to established sentencing practice, the
 negligent behavior of the victims of fraud cannot be taken into account for the benefit of
 the defendants.'4 4Court Decisions BH
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 1994. 64. It is clear from the above decisions that, as a principle, victims of crimes should
 not be blamed for becoming victims and the 'reckless' behaviour of the victim
 should not mitigate the guilt of the perpetrator. £xcept for one type of crime:
 sexual violence. The strongly discriminative character of this distinction should be
 obvious-but it is not. This is largely due to the almost complete lack of feminist
 legal scholarship and feminist analysis of Hungarian jurisprudence. The same lack
 of 'discrimination-consciousness' can be illustrated by the next two cases of self-
 defence. The first is a stereotypical 'woman in self-defence' case; the second is a
 stereotypical 'man in self defence' case. Women are typically attacked by an
 intimate partner in their own homes; men are typically attacked by strangers or
 drinking partners in bars.
 In the first case, the defendant was a pregnant woman who had been regularly
 battered by her aggressive, alcoholic husband. On the day of the event, the victim
 went home, verbally abused his wife, began to batter her, and grabbed and pulled
 out a bunch of her hair. The woman escaped into the kitchen. The man first threw a
 chair against the defendant, then followed her into the kitchen and continued to
 verbally lash out at her. The woman picked up a knife from the kitchen table and
 5Court Decisions BH stabbed the man once in his chest. The man died.5
 1994. 170.
 According to the Court, this was a situation of self-defence, but the act of defence
 was disproportionate to the actual attack and to the one who was making the
 th reat.
 'The victim took action against the defendant without any tools whatsoever, just as he did
 earlier. During the attack, he did not make any comment which would have indicated that
 he wanted to kill the woman, therefore it was obvious that he only targeted the physical
 integrity of the woman. By using a knife, which has the potential of taking human life, the
 defendant exceeded the necessury level of self-defense.'
 In the next case, which should be compared with the above, the defendant was a
 6Court Decisions BH young man who had earlier dated a young woman from his village.6
 1993. 534
 'There were two brothers in the village who felt upset about this reiationship and verbally
 threatened the defendant on several occasions. Therefore, whenever the defendant went
 into the disco club in the neighboring village, he always took a knife with him.
 'On the day of the event, the young man went into the disco club. When he arrived, one of
 the two brothers stood in his way and pushed his forehead twice against the forehead of the
 defendant.
 'The defendant left the person alone, joined a group of people in the bur, sat down and had
 a couple of drinks. The two brothers also entered the premises and when passing by the
 sitting defendant, one of them punched the back of his head with his fist. Later in the
 evening the defendant sturted to walk home with a friend of his. The two brothers joined
 them and one of them asked him 'Why did you assault my brother?', and then slapped the
 defendant on his face. The friend of the defendant stepped between them.
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 'The defendant ran away and stopped about 20 meters away, holding on to a fencew He
 stood there for 5 minutes before one of the brothers went there and punched him on the
 side of his head. The defendant fell on his knees. At this stage, he took the knife from his
 pocket and stabbed the victim twice.'
 According to the analysis of the court,
 twhen evaluating the proportion in -cases of self defense, it is wrong to just mechanically
 look at the tool or tools used by the attacker and the attacked. Instead, the court has to
 evaluate the actual abilities of the persons confronting each other, measure their physical
 power vis-a-vis each other and the abitity to attack on the one hand and defend on the
 other. Both the necessity and the proportion of the act of defense has to be established
 mainly by objective criteria. In this case, the defendant did exceed the necessury measure
 of self-defense. However, the court also has to examine whether this excess was not caused
 by the excusuble fear of the defendant which prevented him from realizing the actual
 seriousness of the attack and therefore returning it with a less severe act of defense. The
 test to be used in such cases is the examination of what was expected of the defendant in
 the particular situation. According to the medical opinion, the defendant experienced
 acute fear already prior to the event, the attack was the last element in a series of
 provocations, the defendant acted out of panic, as a physiological reaction, being pushed
 into a corner. Given that all other possibilities to defend himself were out of the question,
 he acted in a physiologically limited state of mind. It was not the punch on his head, but
 the panic situation which resulted in this limited state of mind. The defendant in this
 limited state of mind was unable to choose the adequate measure for the act of self-
 defense which was necessary. It was impossible for him to realistically evaluate that the
 victims could be handled in another way. Therefore the defendant was acquitted by the
 Supreme Court.'
 The Court's failure to analyse the attacked pregnant woman's state of mind as
 deeply and carefully as in the case of the attacked man in the bar, and the failure
 to use the same tests in evaluating their criminal responsibility, are examples of
 the complete lack of 'gender consciousness' of Hungarian courts.
 conclusion
 It is surprising and sad that almost one and a half decades after the democratic
 transition there is effectively no feminist scholarship and no sensitivity to gender
 (sex-discrimination) aspects of the law in Hungary. In order to charEe this
 situation, we must raise consciousness about sex discrimination's historical
 determinants. In other words, we have to 'contextualize this vacuum'. We have to
 explore the tension between the universality of women's rights and the idea of
 cultural relativism, keeping in mind the specific historical context in Hungary.
 Similarly, we have to challenge the (post-communist) illusions about the meaning
 and content of the principle of the rule of law, and the view that the rule of law
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 and sensitivity to the gendered aspects of the law are in competition. Feminist
 analysis and criticism should not be perceived as threatening the rule of law and
 resulting in arbitrariness. Formal equality (in 'the black letters of the law) should
 be confronted with the realities of de facto discrimination and with discrimination
 in interpreting the black letters of those formally non-discriminative laws. The
 largely discriminative results of vehemently protecting the private sphere from
 government interference should be researched and brought to light. Law makers
 and the general public should learn about models where there is computibility
 between civil liberties cind the protection of women from violence and abuse in the
 home.
 Through large scale, 'hands on' research of case law in all areas of the law
 (including criminal, family and labour law) we have to confront the judiciary (as
 well as the decision-makers of the executive, such as child protection agencies)
 with their discriminatory attitudes.
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